

SECRET

24 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: COP via FB I *[initials]*

SUBJECT: BGFIEND Intelligence

1. For the past month DCO has had the responsibility of rewriting OSO reports connected with operations in BGFIEND and passing this information on to the British liaison officer in Washington. This task was allocated to DCO for the purpose of securely covering OSO sources. The procedure for assuring this security has been that DCO receives the approval of ☐ ☐ and FB I on the finished memorandum.

2. It has come to DCO's attention that the handling of BGFIEND Intelligence requires additional organization of procedure. FB I has been forwarding OSO reports (yellow) to the field. *Field personnel have no instructions concerning the handling of these reports vis-a-vis the British. At the same time DCO is forwarding to the British liaison officer in Washington disguised versions of these same reports. OSO memorandums on the subject of BGFIEND are also occasionally rewritten and handed to the British liaison officer but are not forwarded to OPC field personnel.

3. It is recommended that appropriate OPC personnel establish a procedure for handling the BGFIEND Intelligence which should be promoted to protect sources, to prevent "double confirmation," and to insure that OPC field personnel serve as the principle channel for BGFIEND Intelligence from the United States.

DCO: *[initials]* Jaw

cc FBI *[checkmark]*

*Apart from precautionary advice to observe the Control restriction thereon, *[initials]* 32 b4, n3

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DATE 2007